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I would like thank Martha Cheng for an interesting and tightly constructed
paper. Her topic of Unsolicited Reason-Giving introduces us to a curious
phenomenon. I have only a few brief comments directed (1) to how Cheng
characterizes the conversations she has analyzed, (2) to her discussion of why
interviewees produce unsolicited comments and, (3) to why unsolicited
comments by interviewees seem curious.
Recall the general context Cheng discusses. The phone rings; a young person
on the line wants to ask some questions soliciting our views about this or that
topic. We agree to answer, perhaps grudgingly. Cheng would construe our
answers as claims, and she is inclined to regard elaborations related to our
answers as reasons justifying those claims. This seems to me to be a doubtful
interpretation of the answer respondents give to telephone interviews--an
interpretation which straightjackets Cheng’s subsequent interpretation of and
explanation for the unsolicited comments interviewees provide.
On the face of the matter, the responses which interviewees provide in
telephone interviews simply seem to be reports of the interviewee’s
psychological states and, in some cases, the interviewee’s social/economic
conditions. They are asked whether they believe certain things, how they feel
about this or that, how they judge various matters, whether they are better or
worse off than previously, etc. The answers to these questions seem simply to
be statements which report matters about which the respondent presumably is
knowledgeable, since in all cases the questions are about the respondent’s
beliefs, judgments, and circumstances.
Why should we consider the respondents’s answers to be claims? In her paper
Cheng offers no analysis of what a claim is, so I am unsure how she comes to
regard her interviewees’s answers as claims. I am not prepared here to offer a
full dress analysis of the concept a claim. However, it seems reasonable to
suppose that claims are utterances which have two essential features. First,
they are put forward for belief, consideration, acceptance, etc. Second, they
are put forward in the understanding that the utterer might be called upon, in
some relevant context, to provide grounds or justification which warrant
responding to the utterance as intended. Roughly, then, S claims that p, if S
says that p, (i) intending that some party or parties, e. g., believe (accept,
consider, etc.) that p and (ii) expecting that S may be called upon to provide
reason and evidence which warrant, e.g., believing that p. It is not clear that the
answers respondents give to telephone interview questions satisfying these
conditions.
It is difficult to see any response on the order of belief, consideration,
acceptance which interviewees might anticipate as a result or consequence of
the answers they provide in telephone interviews. In many respects their
communicative situation resembles talking to a tape recorder. The interviewer,
after all, has precisely the role of recording the answers given. Just as it would
be odd to say to tape recorder, e. g., ‘You do believe me, don’t you?’ or ‘That
is an acceptable view, isn’t it?’, so it would also be odd to amplify the answers
given to a telephone interview with questions designed to ascertain whether
one’s conversational-other believed, accepted, or otherwise positively
responded to one’s answers. Accordingly, it is difficulty to see how what one
says in response to a telephone interview could qualify as a claim one was
making on that party or any other potential recipient of one’s answers.
Still, responding to a telephone interviewer is in at least one important respect
different than simply speaking to a mechanical recorder. In a telephone
interview one is doing something a bit like speaking for the record, at least in
the very minimal sense that one’s answer will be compiled with other answers
into a representation of some corresponding body of opinion. If one provides
answers which misrepresent one’s views, one introduces distortion into the
larger representation being assembled. To the degree that one’s answers
result in a misrepresentation of the relevant body of opinion, one’s answers
would foreseeably mislead persons who might rely on that larger
representation. This unfortunate potential outcome might suffice to give many
respondents reason to believe that they ought to truthfully respond to the
interview questions by honestly reporting their beliefs. But this line of thought
merely shows that the interviewee’s answers qualify as statements; we do not
here have a basis for regarding respondents’s answers as claims.
Notice that if we are to construe respondents’s answers as claims on the basis
of their responsibility for the truthfulness of what they say, then their claims will
be claims about the state of their beliefs, the conditions of their lives, etc.
Where a respondent is asked, e. g., ‘Would you agree or disagree with a law
that would require a one week waiting period before a hand gun could be
purchased?’, an affirmative response says (when fully expressed) ‘Yes, I agree
with a law that would require a one week waiting period before a hand gun
could be purchased’. A respondent who says that takes responsibility for this
statement’s being a truthful representation of the state of her commitments.
She has not said that a law should be passed requiring a one week waiting
period before a hand gun could be purchased. Accordingly the respondent has
not claimed that. At most she has claimed that her commitments about gun
legislation are as she represents them to be, and it would seem strange in an
interview situation to treat that answer as a claim.
But suppose we were to construe the respondents’s answers in telephone
interviews as claims that they actually do believe, feel, etc. what they report
themselves to believe, feel, etc. If we then interpret their unsolicited comments
as reasons justifiying those claims, we will have to read their unsolicited
remarks as justifications for believing that they are truthfully reporting their
beliefs, feelings, etc. So, where the respondent says that she believes a law
should be passed requiring a one week waiting period before a hand gun
could be purchased, we would then interpret her unsolicited comments as
reasons for supposing that the respondent actually does believe that such a
law should be passed. Martha Cheng does not seem inclined to interpret
respondents's unsolicited elaborations as providing reason for believing that
the respondents are sincerely and accurately reporting their beliefs. Rather she
wants to interpret the unsolicitied comments our respondent might make as
jusitification for supporting a policy that requires a one week waiting period
before a hand gun could be purchase. So even were we (mistakenly) to
construe interview responses as claims, these responses would not be the sort
of claim that Cheng attributes to respondents.
The second condition necessary for an utterance to qualify as a claim, viz. that
the utterance be put forward in the understanding that the utterer might be
called upon to provide justification for, e. g., believing what the utterer says,
poses an even larger obstacle to interpreting interviewee answers as claims.
Certainly the telephone interviewer is in no position to demand justification of
the respondent. The interviewer’s role precludes that. It would be a joke for an
interviewer to say something on the order of ‘Why should a one week waiting
period be required for a hand gun to be purchased? That view needs
justification’ or ‘You people all say you support gun legislation, but then you
vote the other way’. Humor of this sort would be lost on most interviewees;
many, I suppose, would simply hang up if they met demands for justification
from interviewers. Nor would the situation change were other parties brought
into play. The interviewee will generally be in a position to rebuff questions and
objections with a response on the order of ‘If you aren’t going to accept my
answers why are you bothering me with these questions?’ Were it to become
generally the case that the answers given in telephone interviews seemed to
be unreliable, I suspect the practice of polling by telephone would go into
decline, and I doubt that anyone would then blame the interviewees for giving
unreliable answers. The comment would be that the public had run out of
patience with telephone interviews, so the practice had come to an end. It
seems that there is little avenue for calling upon telephone interviewees to
justify their answers. It hardly seems plausible, then, that those answer qualify
as claims.
Consistent with Cheng’s interpretation of interviewee responses as claims,
she initially regards the supplementary comments respondents provide as
"unsolicited reasons for their answers." Consider the following exchange.
Interviewer, "We are interested in how people are getting along
financially these days. Would you say that you (and your family
living there) are better off or worse off than a year ago?"
Respondent, "Since I’m retired and drawing a social security
check, I guess I’m in the the uh-same."
Cheng interprets the respondent’s answer, ". . . I’m in the the uh same
[condition as a year ago]" as a claim, and the respondent’s unsolicited
comment, "Since I’m retired and drawing a social security check," as a reason
justifying his claim. In some cases, this may be a reasonably accurate
interpretation of the respondent’s unsolicited comment, but, I want to suggest
that given the sample conversation Cheng provides, other interpretations seem
warranted. The idea that respondents’s unsolicited comments are justificatory
reasons may be largely an artifact of Cheng’s initial commitment to treat their
answers as claims.
Interestingly, Cheng’s data lead her to supplement her analysis in ways which,
while insightful, are not entirely consonant with her inclination to treat the
respondents’s unsolicited comments as reasons justifying claims. The first
supplement occurs in connection with Cheng’s classification of unsolicited
comments. Since she primarily interprets those comments as "unsolicited
reasons for their [the respondents’s] answers" She offers a classification of
unsolicited comments based on the type of appeal she finds in the "reasons"
offered by respondents: sentiment, personal fact, impersonal fact, value,
authority, alternatives, and analogy. In addition to these categories, Cheng
recognizes that in some cases the unsolicited comment "is not an appeal in
order to justify an answer. Rather with the reasoning displayed in the instances
the respondent mitigates a claim or reflects upon his or her own thinking
process or knowledge state, or on the question itself." This latter category, on a
scale unto itself, Cheng describes as "meta-thinking." The second supplement
is presented in connection with her explanation of why respondents provide
unsolicited comments. Her primary analysis is that such comments are offered
in order to justify the claims respondents present in their answer, but in some
cases, Cheng suggests, the respondents are externalizing an internal dialogue
in which they critically assess the reasons they have to warrant a claim." While
Cheng tries to interpret these two supplements in ways which fit her primary
interpretation of unsolicited comments as reasons justifying claims, these
important supplements point instead to the diversity of those unsolicited
comments.
Cheng’s category of meta-thinking collects a broad array of comments which
cannot plausibly be construed as reasons justifying claims. It includes
comments respondents make about the questions asked, about their answers,
and about their ability/inability to answer the question asked. The examples of
respondent "meta-thinking" provided by Cheng’s paper suggest a rich variety
in interviewee responses. Consider the answers reported from respondents to
the following question asked a few days after George Bush’s election to office,
"How would you rate the job George Bush has done since the election--
excellent, good, only fair, or poor?" The answers including meta-comments:
"It’s only been a couple of days. Can’t tell." "Well he hasn’t been there very
long. I don’t know." "Can’t comment on that. He’s only been in office one day."
"Well, he just got elected, so uh, I guess good." Chang, if I understand her, is
inclined to construe comments which express "meta-thinking" as utterances
which express the interviewee’s reflection on the justification the respondent
has for a (potential) claim to be made in answer to the question asked. But
these comments responding to a patently premature question about Bush’s
performance in office express thinking about the question being asked and
seem manifestly designed either to reject it as unanswerable or to qualify the
question so as to render it answerable. If we do not initially suppose that
respondent answers are claims, greater variety emerges in their
supplementary comments.
This same point emerges in consideration of the prospect that some of the
unsolicited comments provided by respondents are simply a matter of the
interviewees thinking aloud. There are two points that need to be raised here.
First this category of comment seems to be broader than Cheng suggests,
including comments which she interprets as justification provided for claims.
Consider the example in which the interviewer asks, "We are interested in how
people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you (and
your family living there) are better off or worse off than a year ago?" This
question calls for an inference; the interviewee is asked to report how she or
he would judge a matter. A respondent might not have given this matter much
prior thought, and the conclusion to the inference might not be immediately
obvious to the respondent. So the respondent might have to stop and work out
the inference. To fill the dead air space or assist concentration, the respondent
might do his or her thinking aloud and, so, might produce the following answer,
"Since I’m retired and drawing a social security check, I guess I’m in the the uh-
same." Cheng analyzes this answer as an attempt by the respondent to justify
his answer, but it is very plausible to suppose that the respondent is simply
working out his conclusion aloud. If we do not assume a priori that interviewee
answers are claims and if we recognize, with Cheng, that some supplementary
comments are expressions of the interviewee’s mental effort to work out an
answer to the question asked, some (perhaps many) of the comments which
Cheng interprets as justification for answers will seem more like attempts on
the part of respondents to figure out what they think or believe so that they can
provide the reports requested of them.
Second, Cheng interprets cases in which unsolicited comments are overt
expressions of the interviewee’s thinking process as instances of "critical
thinking" on the part of interviewees, i. e., as expressions of mental efforts to
arrive at justifiable answers. This interpretation is consistent with her
interpretation of respondent answers as claims. If the answers given to
interview questions are understood by respondents as claims, then it would be
natural for them to treat the inferences necessary for them to figure out what
those answers might be as efforts to find justification for the claims they are
making. But this way of interpreting the interviewee’s thinking aloud is
arbitrarily generous. Generous because it makes interviewees out to be critical
thinkers, when in fact their thinking might be no more critical than musings
which bring to mind what feel like relevant beliefs and combine those beliefs to
yield a judgment which can be reported as an answer to the question asked by
the interviewer. Interpreting such musing-aloud as criticial thinking seems
arbitrary because the only reason we have for supposing that the respondents
are being critical in their thinking is Cheng’s initial and highly doubtful
supposition that answers to interview questions are claims.
When one contemplates Cheng’s data unfettered by the supposition that
respondent answers are claims, still further variety seems emerge among the
unsolicited comments she reports. In some cases the respondents may be
less interested in trying to figure out how they judge a matter so that they can
provide a relevant report of their beliefs and more interested in showing off
their reasoning powers. We all have associates who seem never able to
answer a questions without (proudly) exhibiting the reasoning process which
lead them to their answers. It would be odd if none of the unsolicited comments
offered up in telephone interviews had this pedantic character. I suspect we
have just begun to index the variety among solicited comments to telephone
interviews.1
I have been suggesting that Cheng’s topic, unsolicited comments provided in
response to telephone interviews, does not mark out a unified range of
phenomena for which a single or fundamental explanation can be provided. In
conclusion I would like to comment on the initial sense that unsolicited
comments comprise a uniform or unified phenomenon. That intuition initially
arises, I think, not from any recognizable similarity or affinity within this
collection of utterances, but rather from the sense that there is something odd
about them. That sense of oddity may come from something like this. We have
in mind a particular use of linguistic utterances, e. g., to convey information or,
perhaps, to make claims. Unsolicited comments from respondents in
telephone interviews do not conform to that preferred use, so they come to be
aggregated by reason of their deviation from some "normal" use and their
consequent apparent oddity. The basic mistake here, eloquently identified by
Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, is to suppose that linguistic
utterances have only one use or a narrow range of select uses. Whereas, in
fact, verbal expressions have a great many uses. The topic of unsolicited
answers to telephone interview questions is, I think, an interesting one because
it exposes us to some of that variety.
Endnotes 
1A member of the audience for Cheng's paper was from Texas and reported
that the Texas Survey (the source for Cheng's data) is well known in Texas and
is the subject of considerable community pride. This fact suggests another
interpretation for the unsolicited comments provided by respondents. Some
such comments might be offered as indication of how serious and proud the
respondents are about their opportunity to participate in this community event.
This explanation would, of course, be compatible with many other explanations
for those comments. 
 
